# Criminals using Uber to launder money stolen from credit cards?



## Jack Malarkey (Jan 11, 2016)

https://www.google.com.au/amp/s/www...nb-uber-launder-stolen-credit-card-money.html
How criminals use Uber and Airbnb to launder money stolen from your credit card

Kate Fazzini

Published 2:12 PM ET Thu, 7 Feb 2019 Updated 3:30 PM ET Thu, 7 Feb 2019

CNBC.com

Cybercriminals use many methods to launder their illicit gains, including new schemes where they recruit Airbnb hosts or Uber drivers to turn fraudulent funds into clean cash.

Money laundering is an essential element in the proliferation of cybercrime, as much of these funds come in the form of cryptocurrencies with a chain traceable to crime.

Extracts:

Cybercriminals are turning to new technologies to launder their ill-gotten gains, including recruiting fake Uber drivers, shady Airbnb hosts and crypto conversion specialists via the underground dark web, experts say.

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Ziv Mador, who leads cybersecurity firm Trustwave's SpiderLabs research team, said money laundering is essential to allowing cybercrime to proliferate. In fact, if you've ever had money stolen in a cyber scheme or from a hacked credit or debit card, this may be where it ended up.

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For at least the past two years, cybercriminals have used increasingly creative methods centered on "gig economy" apps like Uber and Airbnb, according to Mador. The schemes work to filter dirty money through several automated systems, eventually making their way back to the criminal clean.

In one common scam, criminals recruit Uber drivers to pretend to take them on a ride. The criminal never shows up, but uses illicit money from a stolen credit card to pay for the trip. The driver then wires a portion of the payment for the trip back to the criminal.

Ads seeking help laundering assets by this method can be seen on the dark web, a network of websites outside the established internet only accessible through special applications, Mador said.

Uber first learned about the money laundering because it was so prevalent in the Chinese market, according to a spokesperson, and has taken several steps to fight this type of fraud. Uber ramped up its fraud-detection techniques in 2016, around the time the company pulled out of China. It has fallen to "historical lows" since then, the spokesperson said, but acknowledged it remains a problem. To fight it, the company frequently works with U.S. law enforcement, including one case involving a fake-passenger scheme that led to 13 arrests in New York in 2017.

One common technique fraudsters use is known on underground forums as "acupuncture," the spokesperson said, because it involves a criminal overseas - typically in China or India - colluding with a U.S.-based driver by dropping location "pins" in the application along the driver's regular route. The driver collects the earnings, usually from a stolen credit card, then wires a portion of it back to the overseas criminals, who are known as "nurses" in this scheme.

One reason it's enticing to the real driver is they think 'at least I'm getting paid for driving a route that I'm normally driving anyway.' What they don't realize is it's not just defrauding Uber or our platform, it's wire fraud, it's serious legal liability for the driver," the spokesperson said.

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## Hugh G (Sep 22, 2016)

Jack Malarkey said:


> one case involving a fake-passenger scheme


Sneaky buggers !

*Overview of the Company-1 Scheme*
​With respect to the Scheme involving Company-1, members of the Scheme ordered rides on the Company-1 mobile application ("App-1"), which provided Scheme members with the driver's name, picture, and an anonymized phone number so that the rider could communicate with the driver.​​Scheme members canceled the rides shortly after receiving the driver's anonymized phone number.​​The Scheme members then called the driver on the driver's anonymized telephone number impersonating a representative from Company-1.​​During the call, the Scheme member would ask the driver for the driver's true telephone number and, while remaining on the phone with the driver, the Scheme member would attempt to log into the driver's Company-1 account.​​The driver then received a text message from Company-1 containing a unique code on the driver's cellphone, and the Scheme member impersonating a Company-1 representative then requested that the driver provide this unique code to the Scheme member.​​In addition, during the call, Scheme members would request that the driver provide the driver's license number.​​Using the victim driver's telephone number, driver's license number, and the unique code, Scheme members thereafter logged into the victim driver's Company-1 account through App-1 or the Company-1 web interface without the driver's authorization.​​After Scheme members obtained unauthorized access to the victim driver's account, they changed the bank account information associated with the account to a bank account that either they or another Scheme member controlled. ​​Once the victim driver's account had been compromised and the bank account information altered, funds that the victim driver earned from Company-1 were diverted to Scheme members' bank accounts.​
*Overview of the Company-2 Scheme*

With respect to the Scheme involving Company-2, members of the Scheme ordered rides on the Company-2 mobile application ("App-2"), which provided Scheme members with the driver's name, picture, and an anonymized phone number so that the rider could communicate with the driver.​​Scheme members canceled the rides shortly after receiving the driver's anonymized phone number. The Scheme members then called the driver on the driver's anonymized telephone number impersonating a representative from Company-2.​​During the call, the Scheme member would ask the driver for the driver's true telephone number. The Scheme member would then tell the victim driver that Company-2 would be sending the driver a link to a website that the driver must use to verify the driver's information in order to obtain a bonus from Company-2.​​Thereafter, the Scheme member sent the victim driver a link to a malicious website (the "Fraudulent Company-2 Website"), that was controlled by Scheme members.​​The Fraudulent Company-2 Website was designed to appear as if it were a website maintained by Company-2, and requested, among other information, the driver's login credentials, including the driver's phone number, email address, and unique Company-2 password. Once the victim driver had entered this information on the Fraudulent Company-2 Website, Scheme members used the driver's login credentials to log into the driver's account through App-2 or the Company-2 web interface without the driver's authorization.​​Once Scheme members logged into the victim driver's Company-2 account, Scheme members changed the bank account information associated with the account to a bank account that either they or another Scheme member controlled. ​​Once the victim driver's account had been compromised and the bank account information altered, funds that the victim driver earned from Company-2 were diverted to Scheme members' bank accounts.​​


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## Who is John Galt? (Sep 28, 2016)

Jack Malarkey said:


> In one common scam, criminals recruit Uber drivers to pretend to take them on a ride. The criminal never shows up, but uses illicit money from a stolen credit card to pay for the trip. *The driver then wires a portion of the payment for the trip back to the criminal.*


Jack, I read this article once and I thought.... 'what!?' And then I read it again, and I still don't understand this.

Irrespective of who pays for a trip, and putting aside the small issue of whether the trip is paid for via a legitimate credit card account or a stolen or fraudulent credit card, Über still controls the fare cost and payment process.

And out of every $1:00 of fare (putting aside statutory and other fees for a moment), Über creams off 25¢. Of the remainder, and after all the costs which we are all fully aware of, the driver is widely recognised to earn in the vicinity of ~ $20 per hour, give or take.

So, we have this nefarious criminal organisation, probably a drug cartel like the El Chapo's Sinaloa cartel, or the Guadalajara cartel, which both turn over sqillions of dollars per day, but they have now decided to diversify into the gig economy.  Because it is cool, and one day they might get to deliver drugs in autonomous vehicles. 

And, we have this farsighted criminal mastermind, who probably goes by the name of 'El Übero' and he is holed up in some luxury penthouse hideout, and like James Bond's nemesis, the SPECTRE evil mastermind Ernst Stavro Blofeld, he spends all day sitting around with a püssy in his lap. 










Now this is where I have to worry about El Übero aka Ernst Stavro Überfeld's capacity with a calculator. This is how I see it.....

He (or maybe she) decides to approach disgruntled Über drivers with the intent of setting up a far reaching network of drivers who are not content with earning only ~ $20 per hour, they want more, they want it all !! No more 'Brick in the Wall, Baby!

Are they receptive to El Übero's offer of a better deal? You bet they are!

The tentacles of crime - theft, robbery, larceny and fraud are about to entangle themselves into the driver brotherhood and sisterhood, and bring the entire world's financial system crashing down and become hostage to the evil genius El Übero.

He sends in his lieutenants, to begin the process. The offer to the drivers is compelling. "We will offer you rides on the road to nowhere, and after paying Über's 25% commission and our 50% commission on what is left, we guarantee you will make more money because of more rides but far *more importantly - greater flexibility!* Otherwise....we kill you."

To date, most of the drivers approached have happily got onboard. Many cited the irresistible allure of greater flexibility as being the absolute clincher.

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